Carla B. Abdo-Katispis

Introduction

For much of the past half-century, the United States and Israel have maintained one of the closest bilateral relationships in modern international politics. Their partnership rests on an extensive network of military cooperation, intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination, technological innovation, and shared democratic institutions. American military assistance has helped preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, while Israel has provided Washington with a reliable strategic partner in one of the world’s most volatile regions.¹

The strength of this relationship, however, has also produced a persistent misconception: that American support necessarily translates into American control over Israeli decision-making. Recent disputes over the war in Gaza, humanitarian assistance, settlement expansion, hostage negotiations, and post-war governance have demonstrated otherwise. Despite repeated appeals from Washington for greater restraint and broader diplomatic coordination, successive Israeli governments have frequently pursued policies that diverged from American preferences.² Rather than representing an unprecedented rupture, these disagreements expose an enduring characteristic of alliance politics: close partners often cooperate extensively while simultaneously resisting one another on issues they consider vital to their national interests.

The tendency to interpret Israeli resistance as evidence of either declining American power or an irreparably damaged alliance oversimplifies a far more complicated strategic relationship. Alliance theory has long recognized that asymmetrical partnerships create competing incentives for both stronger and weaker states. Great powers seek reliable allies capable of advancing broader regional objectives, while smaller allies seek security guarantees without sacrificing their freedom of action. As Glenn Snyder argued in his seminal study of alliance politics, alliances are not hierarchical institutions but continuing negotiations between states whose interests overlap without perfectly converging.³

Israel’s recent willingness to disregard American recommendations should therefore be understood less as diplomatic insubordination than as an exercise of strategic autonomy. Successive Israeli governments have consistently maintained that existential security decisions—including military operations, deterrence against Iran and its regional partners, and territorial defense—must ultimately remain sovereign choices regardless of outside pressure. Domestic political dynamics have reinforced this approach. Coalition governments often depend upon parties whose ideological commitments leave little room for compromise on questions involving national security or territorial policy. Consequently, Israeli leaders frequently weigh the domestic costs of accommodating Washington against the diplomatic costs of resisting it and increasingly conclude that the latter are manageable.⁴

For the United States, however, the implications extend well beyond bilateral relations. American leadership depends not only upon military capabilities but also upon the perception that Washington can influence the behavior of its closest partners. Regional governments, European allies, and American adversaries alike observe whether U.S. diplomatic requests produce meaningful policy adjustments in Jerusalem. When repeated appeals fail to alter Israeli decision-making, broader questions inevitably emerge regarding the credibility of American diplomacy, the effectiveness of U.S. regional leadership, and Washington’s capacity to shape outcomes across the Middle East.⁵

Yet this does not necessarily indicate that the alliance is weakening. History demonstrates that enduring alliances frequently experience periods of significant disagreement without fundamentally altering their strategic foundations. NATO allies openly disagreed over Iraq in 2003. Turkey has repeatedly pursued security policies contrary to American preferences while remaining a NATO member. Saudi Arabia has increasingly diversified its foreign partnerships despite maintaining close security ties with Washington. In each case, strategic cooperation persisted because the underlying interests sustaining the alliance continued to outweigh the costs of political friction.⁶

The contemporary U.S.-Israel relationship appears to be entering a similar phase. Military cooperation remains exceptionally robust, intelligence coordination continues at an unprecedented level, and both governments continue to view Iran’s regional ambitions as a principal strategic challenge. Nevertheless, the political balance within the alliance appears to be evolving. Israeli leaders increasingly demonstrate confidence that disagreements with Washington will not fundamentally jeopardize long-term American support, while U.S. administrations face growing domestic and international pressure to reconcile unconditional security commitments with broader diplomatic and humanitarian objectives.⁷

Understanding this evolution requires moving beyond simplistic narratives of obedience or defiance. The central question is not whether Israel is “ignoring” American leadership. Rather, it is whether the United States is entering an era in which traditional instruments of alliance management have become less effective, requiring Washington to rethink how it exercises influence over one of its closest strategic partners. The answer carries implications not only for U.S.-Israel relations but also for American credibility, regional deterrence, alliance management, and the future architecture of Middle Eastern security.

The Limits of American Leverage: Alliance Politics Beyond Patron and Client

Much of the public debate surrounding U.S.-Israel relations rests on a flawed assumption: because the United States provides Israel with extensive military assistance, diplomatic backing, and advanced defense technology, Washington should be able to compel Israeli compliance whenever disagreements arise. When Israeli governments reject American requests, commentators often portray the outcome as evidence of either diplomatic failure or declining U.S. influence. Alliance theory, however, suggests that such expectations misunderstand the nature of asymmetric partnerships.

Although the United States is unquestionably the stronger power, the relationship has never functioned as a simple patron-client arrangement. Instead, it reflects what international relations scholars describe as an asymmetric alliance—one in which both partners possess assets the other values and where influence flows in both directions.¹ Israel depends upon American military aid, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic protection in international forums, and access to advanced defense technologies. The United States, in turn, benefits from intelligence sharing, joint weapons development, operational experience, technological innovation, and a stable democratic partner in a region central to American security interests.² Mutual dependence does not eliminate differences; it changes how leverage operates.

Glenn Snyder’s concept of the alliance security dilemma provides a useful framework for understanding these dynamics. According to Snyder, alliance management requires balancing two competing risks: abandonment and entrapment.³ Smaller allies fear that their patron may withhold support during moments of crisis, while great powers worry that allied actions could draw them into conflicts they neither initiated nor desire. The tension between these competing fears creates continuous bargaining rather than automatic compliance.

For much of the Cold War and the decades that followed, Israeli policymakers viewed the risk of abandonment as particularly acute. Preserving American political support therefore remained a central strategic objective. Today, however, that calculation appears more balanced. Decades of institutionalized military cooperation, congressional backing, intelligence integration, and shared concerns regarding Iran have reduced Israeli fears that temporary political disagreements will fundamentally undermine the alliance.⁴ As confidence in the durability of American support has increased, Israeli governments have demonstrated greater willingness to pursue policies that diverge from Washington’s immediate preferences.

This evolution has implications for American leverage. Influence depends not only on material capabilities but also on the credibility of potential consequences. If Israeli leaders conclude that Washington is unlikely to suspend military cooperation, significantly condition security assistance, or fundamentally alter the strategic partnership, the political costs of resisting American requests decline considerably.⁵ The result is not an absence of leverage but a narrowing of the circumstances in which that leverage is likely to alter Israeli decision-making.

Domestic politics reinforce these structural constraints. Israeli prime ministers govern through coalition systems in which relatively small parties often exercise disproportionate influence over national policy. Decisions regarding military operations, settlement policy, or negotiations with Palestinian actors are therefore shaped not only by strategic assessments but also by coalition stability and electoral survival.⁶ A concession that appears strategically reasonable from Washington may carry unacceptable domestic political costs in Jerusalem.

American policymakers confront their own domestic constraints. Congressional support for Israel remains substantial, although increasingly debated, and administrations must reconcile regional diplomacy, humanitarian concerns, alliance commitments, and domestic political pressures simultaneously.⁷ Consequently, presidents possess fewer coercive policy options than public commentary often assumes. Threats that lack political credibility rarely generate meaningful behavioral change.

These realities illustrate an important distinction between capability and influence. The United States possesses unmatched military power, yet military superiority alone cannot compel an ally to abandon policies it considers essential to national security. As Stephen Walt argues, alliances endure because they serve shared strategic interests, not because one partner consistently dictates the policies of the other.⁸

Recognizing these limits does not imply that American influence has disappeared. Washington continues to shape Israeli strategic planning through intelligence cooperation, joint military exercises, diplomatic coordination, technological partnerships, and long-term defense planning. Indeed, many Israeli security decisions are made in close consultation with American officials. The more accurate conclusion is that U.S. influence is greatest when interests converge and considerably weaker when leaders in Jerusalem conclude that core national security concerns are at stake.

Understanding this distinction is essential for interpreting contemporary disagreements. Israeli resistance to American requests should not automatically be viewed as evidence of alliance deterioration. Rather, it reflects the normal bargaining behavior expected within mature alliances where both parties possess significant strategic value. The real question is not whether Washington can always persuade Israel, but under what conditions persuasion remains more effective than coercion. Answering that question will shape American diplomacy across the Middle East for years to come.

American Credibility and the Regional Balance of Power

If the limits of American leverage primarily affect the bilateral relationship with Israel, their broader significance lies in how they shape regional perceptions of U.S. leadership. International politics is driven not only by material capabilities but also by credibility—the belief that a state’s commitments, promises, and diplomatic initiatives can influence political outcomes.¹ Throughout the Middle East, allies and adversaries alike closely monitor interactions between Washington and Jerusalem because they provide insight into the effectiveness of American leadership at a time of profound regional transformation.

For decades, the United States has served as the principal external security guarantor in the Middle East. Its military presence, defense partnerships, intelligence networks, and diplomatic initiatives have underwritten regional stability despite recurring crises. Yet credibility depends upon more than military strength. It also requires demonstrating an ability to coordinate allies, broker compromises, and translate diplomatic objectives into concrete policy outcomes.²

Repeated public disagreements with Israel therefore carry consequences that extend beyond the immediate issues under dispute. When American administrations call for military restraint, expanded humanitarian access, settlement freezes, or renewed political negotiations and those requests produce little observable change, regional audiences inevitably evaluate not simply Israel’s response but Washington’s capacity to shape the behavior of its closest strategic partner.³

This perception matters because many of America’s regional initiatives rely upon confidence in U.S. diplomatic leadership. Arab governments considering closer security cooperation with Israel, participation in regional missile defense initiatives, or expanded normalization agreements must balance strategic interests against domestic political opinion. If Washington appears unable to influence Israeli policy during periods of heightened regional tension, these governments may become more cautious about publicly aligning themselves with American diplomatic initiatives.⁴

The implications extend beyond America’s partners. Iran and the network of armed groups it supports—including Hezbollah, Hamas, and various Iraqi and Syrian militias—carefully assess alliance cohesion when formulating their own strategic calculations. Visible disagreements between Washington and Jerusalem may be interpreted as evidence that coordination has weakened or that political divisions constrain the willingness of either government to escalate during future crises.⁵ Such interpretations need not be accurate to influence strategic behavior. As Robert Jervis observed, state behavior is frequently shaped by perceptions and misperceptions rather than objective reality.⁶

At the same time, Israeli strategic autonomy can generate the opposite perception. Demonstrating a willingness to disregard external pressure may reinforce Israel’s deterrent posture by signaling that military decisions remain sovereign and will not be constrained by international political considerations. From Israel’s perspective, maintaining this image may strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty regarding Israeli resolve. Consequently, the same political disagreement may produce conflicting interpretations among different regional audiences.

These competing perceptions illustrate why alliance politics cannot be reduced to simple measures of compliance. A visible disagreement may simultaneously weaken perceptions of American diplomatic influence while reinforcing perceptions of Israeli military independence. The strategic consequences depend upon which narrative regional actors find more convincing.

Perhaps nowhere is this tension more evident than in the future of Arab-Israeli normalization. The Abraham Accords demonstrated that shared concerns regarding Iran, economic cooperation, and technological integration could overcome decades of political hostility.⁷ Yet the Gaza conflict has exposed the fragility of this process. Arab governments remain interested in expanded security cooperation with Israel, particularly in response to Iranian regional activities, but they must also navigate domestic public opinion that has become increasingly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.

American diplomacy has historically functioned as the bridge between these competing pressures. Washington has provided security guarantees to Arab partners while encouraging gradual political engagement with Israel. If American influence over Israeli decision-making appears diminished, however, Arab leaders may question whether Washington can deliver the political concessions necessary to sustain further normalization. The result may not be the collapse of regional diplomacy but rather a slower and more conditional process in which governments seek additional assurances before deepening cooperation.⁸

These developments should not be interpreted as evidence of declining American power in an absolute sense. The United States continues to possess unmatched military capabilities, an extensive regional alliance network, and significant economic influence. Rather, they suggest that influence is increasingly negotiated rather than assumed. As regional states diversify their foreign relationships—with China, Russia, India, and emerging middle powers—they enjoy greater strategic flexibility than in previous decades. American diplomacy therefore depends less on hierarchical leadership and more on coalition management, persuasion, and sustained political engagement.

Ultimately, the credibility challenge confronting Washington is not simply whether Israel complies with American requests. It is whether regional actors continue to believe that the United States remains capable of shaping the strategic environment through effective alliance management. Maintaining that perception will require demonstrating that American leadership extends beyond military power to include diplomatic adaptability, political consistency, and the ability to reconcile competing interests among an increasingly diverse network of regional partners.

The Future of the Alliance: From Assumed Influence to Strategic Negotiation

The growing divergence between Washington and Israel should not be interpreted as evidence that the U.S.-Israel alliance is approaching collapse. On the contrary, the institutional foundations of the relationship remain exceptionally strong. Intelligence sharing continues at an unprecedented level, joint military exercises remain routine, missile defense cooperation has expanded significantly, and both governments continue to identify Iran’s regional ambitions and nuclear program as their foremost long-term security concern.¹ These enduring strategic interests make a fundamental rupture highly unlikely.

What appears to be changing instead is the nature of American influence within the alliance. For decades, successive U.S. administrations operated on the assumption that sustained diplomatic engagement, combined with extensive military and economic support, would generally provide sufficient leverage to shape Israeli policy during periods of disagreement. Recent experience suggests that this assumption deserves reconsideration.

Israeli governments increasingly appear willing to absorb diplomatic criticism from Washington when leaders believe core security interests or coalition stability are at stake. At the same time, American administrations have become more cautious about employing coercive measures that could undermine broader regional objectives or generate significant domestic political costs.² The result is an alliance that remains strategically indispensable while becoming politically more negotiated.

This evolution reflects broader changes in international politics. The post-Cold War period was characterized by overwhelming American primacy, allowing Washington to exercise extraordinary influence over allies and adversaries alike. Today, however, the international system has become more diffuse. Regional powers possess greater strategic autonomy, middle powers increasingly diversify their diplomatic partnerships, and allies are often more willing to pursue independent foreign policies even while remaining firmly embedded within American security networks.³ Israel is hardly unique in this regard. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and several NATO allies have all demonstrated a greater willingness to diverge from Washington on issues they consider central to their national interests.

These structural changes suggest that traditional alliance management based primarily on political persuasion may prove less effective than in previous decades. Rather than assuming automatic compliance, future American administrations may increasingly rely on issue-specific bargaining, multilateral diplomacy, and carefully calibrated incentives to shape allied behavior. Such an approach would recognize that influence is most effective when it aligns with an ally’s own strategic calculations rather than attempting to override them.⁴

This does not necessarily imply greater reliance on punitive measures such as conditioning military assistance or reducing diplomatic support. While these options periodically enter public debate, they also carry significant strategic risks. Conditioning support could weaken deterrence against Iran, generate uncertainty among other American allies, and deepen political divisions within both countries. Moreover, history suggests that coercive diplomacy toward close allies often produces diminishing returns when those allies perceive their core security interests to be at stake.⁵

Instead, a more sustainable approach may involve strengthening institutional channels for strategic consultation before crises emerge. Greater coordination on long-term regional planning, post-conflict governance, humanitarian policy, and deterrence strategy could reduce the likelihood that disagreements become public confrontations. Such mechanisms would not eliminate differences, but they could help ensure that political disputes do not undermine broader strategic cooperation.

The alliance must also adapt to changing political realities within both societies. Public opinion in the United States has become increasingly polarized regarding Middle East policy, particularly among younger voters and within parts of the Democratic Party.⁶ Israeli politics have likewise become more fragmented, with coalition governments often dependent on parties that prioritize ideological commitments over diplomatic flexibility. These domestic shifts mean that future disagreements are likely to become more visible and politically contentious than those of previous decades.

For policymakers, the challenge is therefore not to restore an earlier era of presumed American influence that may no longer exist. Rather, it is to develop new mechanisms for managing disagreement within an alliance whose strategic value remains undiminished but whose political dynamics have become considerably more complex. Mature alliances are not defined by the absence of conflict; they are defined by their capacity to absorb conflict without sacrificing their shared strategic objectives.

Ultimately, the evolution of the U.S.-Israel relationship reflects a broader transformation in American statecraft. As global power becomes more dispersed and allies exercise greater strategic autonomy, Washington will increasingly need to lead through negotiation rather than expectation. Success will depend less on compelling compliance than on cultivating consensus among partners whose interests frequently converge but rarely coincide completely. The future of American leadership in the Middle East may therefore depend not on whether allies always follow Washington’s lead, but on whether the United States can continue to build coalitions capable of advancing common strategic interests despite persistent political disagreement.

Conclusion

The recurring disagreements between the U.S.A and Israel should not be understood simply as diplomatic disputes between two governments. Rather, they reflect a broader transformation in the nature of alliance politics in an increasingly multipolar international system. The central lesson is not that Israel has become less dependent on the United States or that American influence has disappeared. Instead, it is that even the closest alliances are governed by bargaining rather than hierarchy. States cooperate because their interests overlap, not because one possesses the authority to dictate the policies of the other.

For Israel, preserving strategic autonomy has long been viewed as an essential component of national security. Successive governments have demonstrated a willingness to accept diplomatic friction with Washington when leaders conclude that military operations, deterrence, or domestic political stability outweigh the benefits of accommodating American preferences. This pattern is unlikely to disappear regardless of which political coalition governs in Jerusalem.

For the United States, however, these developments present a more complex strategic challenge. American leadership has historically rested not only upon unmatched military capabilities but also upon the perception that Washington could coordinate allies, shape regional diplomacy, and influence the strategic decisions of its partners. When visible disagreements with Israel become prolonged or highly public, questions inevitably arise regarding the credibility of American diplomacy throughout the Middle East. Those questions affect far more than bilateral relations. They influence Arab calculations regarding normalization, Iranian assessments of alliance cohesion, European confidence in U.S. leadership, and broader perceptions of American strategic effectiveness.

Yet it would be equally mistaken to interpret these disagreements as evidence of an alliance in decline. The institutional foundations of the U.S.-Israel relationship remain exceptionally resilient. Intelligence cooperation, military interoperability, technological innovation, and shared concerns regarding Iran continue to bind the two countries together in ways that few bilateral relationships can match. Strategic convergence, rather than political unanimity, remains the defining characteristic of the partnership.

The more significant question is therefore not whether the United States can compel Israeli compliance. Rather, it is whether Washington can adapt its approach to alliance management in an era where partners increasingly exercise independent judgment while remaining committed to shared security objectives. As global power becomes more diffuse and regional actors enjoy greater strategic flexibility, influence will depend less on unilateral leverage and more on sustained negotiation, institutional coordination, and political credibility.

This challenge extends beyond Israel. It reflects a broader reality confronting American foreign policy in the twenty-first century: alliances are becoming less hierarchical and more transactional, less dependent on unquestioned leadership and more reliant on continuous strategic bargaining. The United States will increasingly succeed not because allies invariably follow its lead, but because it remains the indispensable actor capable of building durable coalitions among partners whose interests align without ever perfectly converging.

In this respect, the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship offers an important window into the future of American statecraft itself. The question is no longer whether allies occasionally ignore Washington’s preferences; history demonstrates that they always have. The more consequential question is whether the United States can continue to exercise effective leadership in a world where even its closest partners expect consultation rather than direction. The answer will shape not only the future of the U.S.-Israel alliance but also the credibility of American strategy across an increasingly contested international order.

Footnotes

1. Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023, Congressional Research Service Report RL33222 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 28, 2025).
2. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
3. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
4. Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
5. Stephen M. Walt, “The United States Has Less Leverage Over Israel Than You Think,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2024.
6. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
7. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–592.
8. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
9. Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, “Was the Unipolar Moment a Myth? Revisiting the Future of American Primacy,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 2 (2017): 138–149.
10. Steven A. Cook, The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024).
11. Richard N. Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2017).
12. Congressional Research Service, Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2026).
13. Michael Singh, “Don’t Mistake Friction for a Broken Alliance with Israel,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 16, 2026.