Carla B. Abdo-Katsipis

For nearly seven years, U.S.-Turkey relations have been defined by mistrust. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system in 2019 led to its removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and one of the deepest crises in bilateral relations since the Cold War.¹ President Donald Trump’s announcement that his administration intends to lift sanctions on Turkey and consider restoring Ankara’s access to the F-35 program therefore represents a potentially dramatic reversal in American policy.¹

Whether these measures ultimately survive congressional scrutiny remains uncertain. Yet the announcement itself represents more than a diplomatic gesture. It reflects a changing strategic environment in which Washington increasingly views Turkey not as a problematic ally to be managed, but as an indispensable regional power whose cooperation is essential to NATO’s southern flank, the Black Sea, and the Middle East.²

If implemented, the decision would reshape security calculations from Athens to Jerusalem, alter Russia’s influence within NATO, and strengthen President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s domestic political position. More broadly, it signals that Washington may be recalibrating its Middle East strategy to prioritize geopolitical competition and alliance cohesion over longstanding bilateral disputes.

Why the United States Is Changing Course

The timing is not accidental.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s strategic importance has only increased. It controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention, hosts critical NATO military infrastructure, borders Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia, and fields NATO’s second-largest military.³ Few allies occupy such a strategically significant geographic position.

The Trump administration appears to have concluded that isolating Turkey has yielded diminishing returns. Despite sanctions, Ankara never abandoned the S-400 system. Instead, bilateral defense cooperation stagnated while Turkey accelerated investment in indigenous defense industries, including armed drones, naval construction, missile development, and its fifth-generation fighter program, KAAN.⁴

Rather than fundamentally altering Turkish behavior, sanctions arguably reduced American influence over one of NATO’s most strategically important members. The administration’s new approach appears grounded in strategic realism rather than reconciliation. Washington may have concluded that restoring defense cooperation is preferable to allowing Turkey to drift further toward strategic autonomy or deeper defense cooperation with Russia and other non-Western partners.⁵

Domestic Political Victory for Erdoğan

For President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Trump’s announcement is likely to be portrayed domestically as a significant political victory.

For years, Turkish officials argued that the United States unfairly punished Turkey despite its longstanding contributions to NATO. Ankara maintained that its removal from the F-35 program represented political retaliation rather than sound alliance management. The prospect of sanctions relief allows Erdoğan to claim that Turkey refused to yield to American pressure, that strategic patience ultimately succeeded, and that pursuing an independent foreign policy did not result in permanent isolation.

These developments also arrive during continued economic challenges. Inflation, currency instability, and declining purchasing power remain major domestic concerns. Foreign policy achievements frequently provide governments with opportunities to redirect public attention toward national prestige and international influence. Erdoğan is therefore likely to frame renewed American engagement as evidence that Turkey has emerged as an autonomous regional power capable of negotiating with great powers from a position of strength rather than dependency.

Israel Faces a More Complicated Strategic Environment

Among America’s regional partners, Israel has perhaps the greatest reason for concern.

Israeli governments have long relied upon maintaining a Qualitative Military Edge (QME), ensuring that Israel retains superior military capabilities over potential regional adversaries. Although Turkey remains a NATO ally rather than a hostile state, relations between Ankara and Jerusalem have deteriorated significantly over the past decade. Following the Gaza war, Erdoğan became one of Israel’s most vocal critics, repeatedly accusing the Israeli government of war crimes and supporting international legal action against Israeli officials. Against this backdrop, Israeli policymakers increasingly question whether Turkey should regain access to America’s most advanced military technologies.⁶

Even if Israel maintains its technological superiority through newer variants of the F-35 and future sixth-generation systems, restoring Turkey’s access to stealth aircraft would alter long-term regional military planning. Israeli concerns extend beyond aircraft themselves. Ankara’s growing influence in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the South Caucasus increasingly shapes the regional balance of power in ways that may not align with Israeli strategic preferences.

Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean

Athens is also likely to view the announcement cautiously.

Although Greece and Turkey have improved diplomatic relations in recent years, longstanding disputes over maritime boundaries, exclusive economic zones, Cyprus, airspace, and offshore energy exploration remain unresolved.

Greece has invested heavily in military modernization through the acquisition of French Rafale fighters and participation in the F-35 program. A Turkish return to fifth-generation aviation would narrow the technological gap and could encourage renewed defense competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even absent military conflict, shifts in military capability affect diplomatic bargaining, deterrence, and crisis management.

Russia Emerges as the Strategic Loser

Ironically, one of the greatest losers from a renewed U.S.-Turkey partnership may be Russia.

The original S-400 sale accomplished two strategic objectives for Moscow. It generated billions of dollars in defense exports while simultaneously driving a wedge between Washington and Ankara. Those divisions weakened NATO interoperability and complicated alliance planning.

Improved U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation would reduce Moscow’s ability to exploit tensions within NATO. Turkey is unlikely to abandon its pragmatic relationship with Russia, as the two countries continue cooperating—and competing—in Syria, Libya, the Caucasus, energy markets, and Black Sea security. Nevertheless, restoring defense ties with Washington would diminish one of Russia’s most significant geopolitical successes of the past decade.

Syria Remains the Central Test

Perhaps nowhere are the implications more immediate than Syria.

For years, Washington and Ankara have fundamentally disagreed over Kurdish forces operating in northeastern Syria. The United States has viewed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as an indispensable partner against the Islamic State, while Turkey regards key elements of the SDF as extensions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both governments designate as a terrorist organization.

Improved bilateral relations could facilitate greater intelligence sharing, military coordination, and deconfliction mechanisms. Yet sanctions relief alone will not resolve these underlying strategic disagreements. Indeed, improved relations may increase Turkish expectations that Washington should reconsider its continued partnership with Kurdish forces.

The future trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations may therefore depend less on fighter aircraft than on whether both governments can reconcile competing security priorities in Syria.

NATO and Alliance Cohesion

At the alliance level, the announcement reflects an important shift in American strategic thinking.

Rather than permanently excluding allies whose policies diverge from Washington’s preferences, the Trump administration appears more willing to restore cooperation when broader geopolitical interests demand it. This reflects a more pragmatic philosophy of alliance management: difficult allies remain strategically valuable allies.

Whether this strengthens NATO cohesion or encourages future partners to challenge American red lines remains an open question. Nevertheless, the policy shift suggests that Washington increasingly prioritizes strategic necessity over unresolved political grievances.

Congress: The Decisive Gatekeeper

While President Trump’s announcement has altered the political conversation surrounding U.S.-Turkey relations, Congress is likely to remain the principal obstacle to any meaningful restoration of defense cooperation. Although the executive branch directs foreign policy, Congress exercises significant oversight over major foreign military sales and has consistently demonstrated bipartisan skepticism toward Ankara’s recent strategic trajectory.⁹

The principal concern remains Turkey’s continued possession of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Lawmakers from both parties have repeatedly argued that allowing Turkey to operate the S-400 while simultaneously acquiring the F-35 presents unacceptable counterintelligence risks. The concern is not simply that sensitive aircraft data could be compromised, but that Russia could potentially gain valuable insights into the F-35’s radar signature, electronic warfare capabilities, and operational characteristics if both systems coexist within the same military infrastructure.⁹

Congressional reservations, however, extend well beyond the S-400. Over the past decade, members of Congress have increasingly criticized Turkey’s democratic backsliding, restrictions on press freedom, detention of political opponents, military operations against Kurdish groups in Syria, maritime disputes with Greece and Cyprus, and increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward Israel. Collectively, these issues have eroded what was once broad bipartisan support for Turkey within Washington.

Consequently, any proposal to restore Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program or approve a direct sale would almost certainly face extensive hearings, requests for classified intelligence assessments, and vigorous debate within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Members are likely to demand clear assurances regarding the future of the S-400 system, guarantees protecting sensitive U.S. technology, and evidence that renewed military cooperation advances broader American strategic interests.

This does not necessarily mean Congress will reject the administration’s initiative outright. Rather, legislators may seek to attach stringent conditions to any approval. These could include requiring Turkey to permanently deactivate or remove the S-400 system, strengthening NATO interoperability, or demonstrating greater cooperation on regional security issues. Conditional approval would allow Congress to support rebuilding the bilateral relationship while preserving oversight of advanced military technology.

For the Trump administration, this means that announcing a policy reset is considerably easier than implementing one. Even if the White House concludes that restoring defense ties with Ankara serves American strategic interests, congressional approval remains essential before advanced military capabilities such as the F-35 can be transferred. The future of the proposed sale will therefore depend not only on diplomacy between Washington and Ankara, but also on whether the administration can persuade lawmakers that the geopolitical benefits outweigh the enduring security risks.¹ ⁹

Looking Ahead

The significance of Trump’s announcement lies less in the aircraft themselves than in what they reveal about evolving American strategy.

Washington increasingly appears willing to accept a more independent Turkey in exchange for closer strategic cooperation against shared challenges. Rather than demanding complete policy alignment, the administration seems prepared to rebuild relations based upon overlapping interests.

For Turkey, this represents renewed recognition of its geopolitical indispensability. For Israel and Greece, it introduces new uncertainty into regional military balances. For Russia, it weakens one of the most significant fractures within NATO. And for the Middle East more broadly, it demonstrates that American regional priorities are once again shifting toward great-power competition, alliance cohesion, and strategic flexibility.

Whether the proposed F-35 sale ultimately occurs is almost secondary. The larger story is that the United States appears to be redefining its relationship with Turkey—not as a troublesome partner to discipline, but as a strategically indispensable ally whose cooperation is increasingly viewed as essential to the future security architecture of both Europe and the Middle East.

References

1. Reuters. “Trump says he will lift Turkey sanctions, decide on selling F-35s.” July 2026.
2. Jim Townsend and Rachel Ellehuus. Repairing U.S.-Turkey Relations: Strategic Imperatives for NATO. Center for a New American Security, 2023.
3. U.S. Congressional Research Service. Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations. Updated 2025.
4. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2026. Routledge, 2026.
5. Aaron Stein. The U.S.-Turkey Relationship after the S-400 Crisis. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2024.
6. Reuters. “Netanyahu raises concerns over possible F-35 sale to Turkey.” July 2026.
7. Galip Dalay. “Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy and the Future of NATO.” Chatham House Research Paper, 2023.
8. Aslı Aydıntaşbaş. Turkey’s New Geopolitics. Brookings Institution, 2023.
9. U.S. Congressional Research Service. Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress. Updated 2025.