Carla B. Abdo-Katsipis

Should the United States confront Iran or pursue diplomacy? Should Washington stand unequivocally with Israel or place greater emphasis on protecting Palestinian civilians? Should military success be measured by targets destroyed or by political outcomes achieved? American debates over the Middle East increasingly present these questions as binary choices. Yet five University of Maryland Critical Issues Polls conducted between June 2025 and July 2026 suggest that Americans themselves rarely think in such absolute terms.

Political discourse often assumes that citizens evaluate foreign policy through competing ideological commitments: hawkish versus dovish, pro-Israel versus pro-Palestinian, interventionist versus isolationist. These frameworks simplify complex strategic questions into familiar political identities, but they also imply that support for one policy position necessarily requires rejection of its opposite.

The polling tells a different story.

Across questions concerning Iran’s nuclear program, the Israel-Hamas war, antisemitism, military intervention, and regional security, respondents consistently evaluated individual policies rather than embracing fixed ideological packages. They distinguished political objectives from military instruments, support for allies from unconditional endorsement of allied governments, and battlefield performance from strategic success. Taken together, the surveys suggest that Americans often approach Middle East policy through a conditional rather than binary framework.

This finding should not be mistaken for an argument that public opinion ought to determine foreign policy. Democratic governments cannot outsource strategy to polling, nor should elected officials abandon long-term national interests in response to short-term fluctuations in public sentiment. Nevertheless, understanding how citizens evaluate diplomacy, military force, and alliances provides important insight into the political foundations upon which durable foreign policy ultimately depends. These five questionnaires therefore offer more than snapshots of opinion during a period of regional instability. Collectively, they illuminate how Americans reason about U.S. engagement in the Middle East.

Strategic Objectives Are Not Strategic Instruments

Perhaps the clearest illustration of this pattern appears in public attitudes toward Iran.

For decades, debates surrounding Iran’s nuclear program have frequently conflated strategic objectives with the instruments used to achieve them. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has often been presented as inseparable from the willingness to employ military force. The implicit assumption is straightforward: opposition to military action reflects acceptance of a nuclear Iran, while support for preventing proliferation necessarily implies support for military confrontation.

Evidence from the February 2026 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, Prospects of War with Iran, challenges that assumption. When asked whether the United States should initiate an attack on Iran under existing circumstances, only 21 percent favored military action, while 49 percent opposed it.[1] Public reluctance to endorse war, however, did not translate into indifference toward Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Rather, respondents distinguished between the objective of preventing nuclear proliferation and the question of whether military force represented the most effective means of achieving that objective.

The survey further demonstrates that Americans evaluated the consequences of war through the lens of national interest rather than geopolitical rivalry. Only 31 percent believed a U.S.-Iran war would primarily advance American interests, while 16 percent believed it would primarily advance Israeli interests. One-third of respondents remained uncertain.[2] These findings suggest that respondents viewed military conflict not as an end in itself but as a policy instrument whose legitimacy depended upon its expected strategic consequences.

The same pattern appears in the June 2025 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, American Public Attitudes Toward the U.S. Bombing of Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. Asked whether the U.S. attack primarily advanced American or Israeli interests, only 21 percent concluded that it mostly advanced American interests, whereas 30 percent believed it primarily advanced Israeli interests.[3] Public opinion therefore evaluated military action not simply by whether it damaged Iranian nuclear facilities, but by whether it meaningfully advanced American strategic objectives.

Respondents also demonstrated skepticism regarding the long-term effectiveness of military action. Equal proportions—30 percent each—believed the strikes made Iran more likely or less likely to develop nuclear weapons, while one-fifth believed they would have little effect.[4] Rather than assuming that military force necessarily resolved the underlying strategic problem, Americans expressed considerable uncertainty regarding its efficacy.

As military confrontation continued, these judgments remained remarkably consistent. The May 2026 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, Poll on Iran War, found that only 16 percent believed the United States was winning the conflict, while 56 percent concluded that the war had harmed American interests overall.[5] Two months later, the July 2026 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, Poll on Iran War, reported nearly identical findings: only 15 percent believed the United States was winning, while 58 percent believed the conflict had negatively affected American interests.[6] The consistency of these results is striking. Despite continued military operations, respondents continued to evaluate the conflict primarily according to its perceived strategic consequences rather than battlefield performance alone.

The July 2026 survey reinforces this distinction further. Asked how the United States should prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, only 21 percent supported doing so “even by war.” Comparable or larger shares preferred preventing proliferation without military force (19 percent) or pursuing a broader regional nuclear-free zone that would include both Israel and Iran (22 percent).[7] These responses demonstrate that Americans distinguished the strategic objective from the policy instrument. Preventing nuclear proliferation remained important, but military escalation was viewed as only one among several possible approaches.

Taken together, these findings reveal a public that consistently separates ends from means. Americans did not reject the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Rather, they questioned whether military force should automatically be regarded as the preferred—or inevitable—instrument for achieving that objective.

Supporting Allies Is Not Unconditional Support

The distinction Americans draw between strategic objectives and military instruments is not unique to Iran. It also shapes how they evaluate America’s closest partner in the Middle East. Public debate frequently portrays support for Israel and concern for Palestinians as mutually exclusive positions, implying that criticism of Israeli government policy necessarily reflects opposition to the U.S.-Israel relationship. The July–August 2025 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the Russia-Ukraine War, and Other Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues, suggests that many Americans approach these questions differently. Rather than viewing the conflict through fixed ideological commitments, respondents consistently distinguished among the alliance with Israel, the conduct of the Israeli government, humanitarian conditions in Gaza, and broader American strategic interests. The survey indicates that Americans are often willing to evaluate each of these questions independently rather than collapsing them into a single political test of loyalty.

This distinction is particularly evident in responses concerning antisemitism. Public discourse increasingly conflates criticism of Israeli government policy with hostility toward Jewish people. The survey suggests that Americans make finer distinctions. Nearly three-quarters of respondents identified prejudice against Jews as antisemitism, yet only 28 percent considered opposition to Zionism inherently antisemitic, while an identical 28 percent viewed criticism of Israeli government policies as antisemitic. Roughly one-third rejected those propositions outright, and many others expressed uncertainty.[8]  Rather than collapsing political disagreement, national identity, and religious prejudice into a single category, respondents demonstrated a more differentiated understanding of these issues.

These distinctions challenge one of the central assumptions underlying contemporary debates about American alliances. Political rhetoric frequently portrays support for allies as requiring unconditional endorsement of their governments’ decisions, while criticism of allied policies is often characterized as weakening the alliance itself. The survey suggests many Americans see alliances differently. They appear willing to support Israel’s long-term security while simultaneously evaluating particular military operations or political decisions according to their consequences for regional stability, humanitarian conditions, and American interests.

Military Success Is Not Strategic Success

The same conditional reasoning extends beyond questions of alliances. It also shapes how Americans judge the success of military campaigns themselves. Military success is often measured through operational indicators: targets destroyed, adversary capabilities degraded, territory secured, or deterrence restored. These measures are indispensable for assessing military performance, but they do not answer the broader strategic question of whether military action advances political objectives. Tactical victories matter only insofar as they contribute to favorable political outcomes.

This perspective reflects a fundamental principle of statecraft. Military power can create opportunities, impose costs, and deter adversaries, but it cannot define political success by itself. Respondents consistently evaluated military operations according to whether they improved America’s strategic position rather than whether they simply demonstrated resolve. In doing so, they separated military activity from strategic effectiveness.

Conclusion

Viewed individually, each questionnaire captures public opinion at a particular moment of heightened tension in the Middle East. Considered together, however, they reveal something more significant than changing attitudes toward individual crises. Across questions concerning Iran’s nuclear program, the Israel-Hamas war, antisemitism, alliances, and military intervention, Americans consistently rejected the false choices that often dominate Washington’s foreign policy debates.

Respondents distinguished between preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and supporting war. They distinguished between supporting Israel and endorsing every decision made by the Israeli government. They distinguished between opposing antisemitism and equating criticism of Israeli policy with prejudice against Jewish people. Finally, they distinguished between military action and strategic success, evaluating military campaigns according to whether they advanced American interests rather than whether they merely demonstrated force.

These findings should not be interpreted as a blueprint for U.S. foreign policy. Public opinion cannot substitute for strategy, nor should policymakers govern by polling. Democratic leadership sometimes requires decisions that are initially unpopular but strategically necessary. At the same time, democratic governments ignore public reasoning at their peril. Understanding how citizens evaluate military force, diplomacy, and alliances provides insight into the political foundations upon which sustainable foreign policy ultimately rests.

The broader implication extends beyond the Middle East. Contemporary political debate increasingly rewards binary thinking, reducing complex strategic questions to tests of ideological consistency or political loyalty. The evidence from these five University of Maryland Critical Issues Polls suggests that many Americans reason differently. Rather than demanding a choice between diplomacy and force, or between support for allies and accountability for their actions, respondents consistently evaluated whether particular policies advanced identifiable political objectives at acceptable strategic cost.

For policymakers, that may be the most important finding of all. Effective strategy requires more than choosing sides in polarized debates. It requires recognizing that military force, diplomacy, and alliances are complementary instruments whose value depends upon the purposes they serve. The surveys suggest that many Americans already understand this distinction. The challenge is whether Washington is prepared to do the same.

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[1] University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, Prospects of War with Iran (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, February 2026), Q1.

[2] Ibid., Q2.

[3] University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, American Public Attitudes Toward the U.S. Bombing of Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, June 2025), Q2.

[4] Ibid., Q1.

[5] University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, Poll on Iran War May 2026 (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, May 2026), Q7–Q8.

[6] University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, Poll on Iran War July 2026 (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, July 2026), Q1–Q2.

[7] Ibid., Q3.

[8] University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the Russia-Ukraine War, and Other Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, July–August 2025), Q16.