Carla B. Abdo-Katsipis

The latest exchange between Washington and Tehran may ultimately be remembered less for the missiles that were launched than for the strategic questions they raised across the Arabian Peninsula.

Following renewed American strikes inside Iran, Tehran responded by targeting facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait while simultaneously placing the region on notice that states facilitating American military operations could face retaliation. The message extended beyond the Gulf. It also reached Jordan, another longstanding U.S. security partner whose territory, military cooperation, and strategic location make it an indispensable component of Washington’s regional posture.

The broader geopolitical signal was unmistakable: countries hosting or supporting U.S. military operations can no longer assume they will remain insulated from the consequences of U.S.-Iran confrontation.

That reality carries profound implications for the future of the American-led security architecture in the Middle East.

For more than four decades, Gulf monarchies—and key regional partners such as Jordan—have relied on a straightforward strategic bargain. In exchange for hosting American forces, granting military access, and aligning closely with Washington, they received security guarantees, advanced military capabilities, intelligence cooperation, and protection of vital trade routes. The American security umbrella became the foundation upon which governments pursued economic modernization and domestic stability.

Yesterday’s attacks challenge that bargain.

Rather than functioning solely as a shield, American military facilities increasingly risk becoming magnets for retaliation. As U.S.-Iran tensions escalate, the very military presence intended to deter conflict may instead increase the likelihood that allied territory becomes part of the battlefield.

This does not mean Washington’s partners are abandoning the United States. American intelligence, missile defense, naval power, and advanced weapons systems remain indispensable. No alternative partner—not China, Russia, nor Europe—can currently replace the United States as the region’s primary security guarantor.

Yet strategic dependence is no longer synonymous with strategic confidence.

The Cost of Alliance

For Gulf policymakers—and increasingly for Jordanian decision-makers—the central question is no longer whether the United States remains militarily dominant. It is whether close alignment with Washington now carries greater strategic costs than it once did.

Iran’s actions suggest a changing strategic logic. From Tehran’s perspective, countries hosting American forces or facilitating U.S. military operations are not neutral observers. They form part of Washington’s regional military architecture and therefore become potential targets whenever conflict escalates.

For Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, this represents a significant shift. Their strategic importance to the United States increasingly overlaps with their exposure to Iranian retaliation.

The result is a paradox. The infrastructure designed to provide security may simultaneously increase vulnerability during periods of heightened confrontation.

Jordan’s Unique Position

Jordan occupies a particularly difficult position.

Unlike the Gulf monarchies, Jordan sits at the crossroads of several active conflict zones. It borders Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia while hosting U.S. military personnel and serving as a critical logistics and intelligence hub. It has also demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with Western and regional partners in defending its airspace against Iranian drones and missiles.

These realities make Jordan indispensable to American regional operations—but they also increase its exposure to escalation.

Amman has consistently pursued a cautious foreign policy, seeking to preserve close ties with Washington while avoiding direct confrontation with Tehran. That balancing strategy becomes more difficult if Iran increasingly defines participation not by political intent but by military cooperation.

Jordan therefore faces many of the same strategic questions confronting the Gulf monarchies: how to preserve the benefits of the American alliance without becoming a frontline state in every future U.S.-Iran crisis.

The End of Strategic Neutrality

For years, Gulf governments sought to balance security cooperation with Washington alongside pragmatic diplomacy with Tehran. Jordan adopted a similar approach, maintaining close security coordination with the United States while avoiding unnecessary escalation with Iran whenever possible.

Recent events suggest that this balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult.

As military exchanges intensify, Tehran appears less willing to distinguish between American forces and the governments supporting them. Even states actively seeking to remain outside the conflict risk becoming participants because of geography, alliance commitments, or operational cooperation.

This narrowing space for neutrality fundamentally alters regional strategic calculations.

Economic Security Is National Security

The implications extend beyond military bases.

The Gulf’s ports, desalination plants, energy facilities, financial centers, and shipping lanes—and Jordan’s critical transportation and logistics corridors—form part of a regional economic system upon which international commerce depends.

Iran has long understood that threatening infrastructure can generate greater strategic leverage than targeting military forces alone. Economic disruption imposes costs not only on regional governments but also on global markets, increasing pressure for diplomatic restraint.

The latest attacks underscore that modern conflict increasingly targets the systems supporting regional prosperity rather than military assets alone.

A New Strategic Conversation

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the latest escalation is political rather than military.

Across Gulf capitals and in Amman, policymakers are likely asking a fundamental question: Does hosting American forces still enhance national security, or does it increasingly expose their countries to risks beyond their control?

The answer is unlikely to be a rupture with Washington. Instead, regional governments may seek to reduce strategic dependence by investing in indigenous defense capabilities, strengthening regional diplomacy, diversifying international partnerships, and exercising greater strategic autonomy while preserving their alliance with the United States.

The objective is not to replace Washington but to reduce the costs associated with becoming a frontline state in U.S.-Iran competition.

Conclusion

The immediate military damage from yesterday’s attacks may ultimately prove less consequential than the questions they have raised about the future of regional security.

The American security umbrella remains indispensable. Yet its regional partners increasingly confront a difficult reality: the same alliance that provides deterrence may also increase their exposure to retaliation.

For Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and other American partners, the challenge is no longer whether the United States can provide security. It is whether the existing security bargain—one that has underpinned regional order for decades—can be adapted to an era in which American military presence is viewed not only as protection but also as a source of strategic risk.

If regional governments conclude that the balance has shifted, the lasting legacy of the latest U.S.-Iran confrontation may not be measured by the missiles exchanged. It may be remembered as the moment America’s closest Middle Eastern partners began reassessing the foundations of the regional security architecture itself.